

$$\gcd(a, b) = x \cdot a + y \cdot b \quad x, y \in \mathbb{Z}$$

7 The discrete logarithm and Related Cryptosystems

The discrete log forms the basis of numerous cryptographic protocols, the most famous is the El Gamal Cryptosystem.

Def 7.1 Let $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$

$$\text{ord}_n(a) = \min \{k \in \{1, \dots, \varphi(n)\} \mid a^k \equiv 1 \pmod{n}\}$$

is called the order of a modulo n . a is called primitive element modulo n (PE), if $\text{ord}_n(a) = \varphi(n)$.

Idea behind this definition:

$$|\mathbb{Z}_n^*| = \varphi(n). \text{ If } a \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* \text{ is a PE mod } n, \text{ then (since } \mathbb{Z}_n^* \text{ is a group)} \\ \underbrace{a^1 \pmod{n}, \underbrace{a^2 \pmod{n}, \dots, \underbrace{a^{\varphi(n)}}_{\not\equiv 1} \pmod{n}}_{\not\equiv 1}}_{\equiv 1} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$$

Suppose that $\exists 1 \leq i < j \leq \varphi(n) \quad a^i \equiv a^j \pmod{n} \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$
 Then $a^{j-i} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$

$$\text{Hence : } \{a^1 \pmod{n}, \dots, a^{\varphi(n)} \pmod{n}\} = \mathbb{Z}_n^*$$

\mathbb{Z}_n^* is generated by powers of a . Such groups are called cyclic.
 a is called a generator.

Problem: Is there always a PE mod n ?

Theorem 7.2 a) There exists a PE modulo n iff

$$n \in \{2, 4, p^k, 2 \cdot p^k \mid p \geq 3 \text{ is prime, } k \in \mathbb{N}\}.$$

b) If a PE mod n exists, then there are $\varphi(\varphi(n))$ many.

Particularly, if $n=p$ prime, $\exists a \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*: \mathbb{Z}_p^* = \{a^k \mid k=0, \dots, p-1\}$

Example: $n=7$, $\ell(n)=6$. Determine all PE mod 7

	powers mod 7
$a=2$	$2, 4, 8 \equiv 1 \pmod{7} \rightarrow$ no PE
$a=3$	$3, 9 \equiv 2, 2 \cdot 3 = 6, 6 \cdot 3 \equiv 4, 4 \cdot 3 \equiv 5, 5 \cdot 3 \equiv 1 \pmod{7} \rightarrow$ PE
$a=5$	$5, 25 \equiv 4, 4 \cdot 5 \equiv 6, 6 \cdot 5 \equiv 2, 2 \cdot 5 \equiv 3, 3 \cdot 5 \equiv 1 \pmod{7} \rightarrow$ PE

$$\rightarrow \text{holds that } \ell(\ell(7)) = \ell(6) = |\{1, 5\}| = 2$$

$$\text{Hence, 3 and 5 are the only PE}$$

Def 7.4: Let a be a PE modulo n , $y \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$. There exists a unique $x \in \{0, \dots, \ell(n)-1\}$ with $y \equiv a^x \pmod{n}$

x is called the discrete logarithm of y. Notation: $x = \log_a(y)$

Particularly, if $n=p$ prime:

$$\forall y \in \mathbb{Z}[y \neq 0] \exists! x \in \{0, \dots, p-1\} \quad y \equiv a^x \pmod{p}$$

$y \equiv a^x \pmod{n}$ is a one-way function

1. $a^x \pmod{n}$ (modular exponentiation) can be efficiently computed by the square-and-multiply method.

Example: $y = a^{26} \rightarrow 26 = (11010)_2$ binary representation

$$26 \equiv 2 \cdot 13 + 0$$

$$13 \equiv 2 \cdot 6 + 1$$

$$6 \equiv 2 \cdot 3 + 0$$

$$3 \equiv 2 \cdot 1 + 1$$

$$1 \equiv 2 \cdot 0 + 1$$

$$\begin{aligned} & ((\underbrace{(a^2 \cdot a)^2 \cdot a}_{} \cdot a)^2 \\ & \quad \underbrace{\cdot a}_{} \\ & \quad \underbrace{a^3}_{} \\ & \quad \underbrace{a^6}_{} \\ & \quad \underbrace{a^{13}}_{} \\ & \quad \underbrace{a^{26}}_{} \end{aligned}$$

Alg: Let $x = (b_k, \dots, b_1, b_0)_2 = \sum_{i=0}^k b_i \cdot 2^i$ $b_k = 1$

Square-and-Multiply

$Y \leftarrow a \text{ mod } n$ $1/b_k = 1$

for i from $k-1$ down to 0 do

$Y \leftarrow Y^2 \text{ mod } n$

if ($b_i = 1$) then

$Y \leftarrow Y \cdot a \text{ mod } n$

end if

end for

Number of multiplications : $\lfloor \log_2(x) \rfloor + \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} b_i$
 $(k \text{ squarings}) \quad (\text{multiplications})$

$\sum_{i=0}^{k-1} b_i$ represents the no. of '1's in the binary representation of x

2. For appropriate a and n , computing $\log_a(Y)$ is considered computationally infeasible.

Overview of existing alg:

Menezes et al., p. 104 - 113

Stinson (02), p 228 ff

Cohen et al (06), chapter 19

7.1 Diffie-Hellman Key Distribution and Key Agreement (76)

Technique providing (unauthenticated) key agreement, allowing two parties to establish a shared (secret) key over an open channel.

- Initial setup: A prime p and a PE mod p $a \in \{2, \dots, p-1\}$ are selected and published.

Protocol actions:

A chooses a random secret $x \in \{2, \dots, p-2\}$, sends B: $u = a^x \pmod{p}$

B chooses a random secret $y \in \{2, \dots, p-2\}$, sends A: $v = a^y \pmod{p}$

B receives u , compute the shared key $k = u^y = (a^x)^y \pmod{p}$

A receives v , " " " " " $k = v^x = (a^y)^x \pmod{p}$

- Generation of a $\varphi(p)$, a PE mod p :

Prop. 7.5 | $p \geq 3$ prime, $p-1 = \prod_{i=1}^k p_i^{t_i}$ (prime factorization)

a PE mod p ($\Leftrightarrow a^{(p-1)/p_i} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{p}$) $\forall i = 1, \dots, k$

Proof: Ex

Application:

1. choose a large random number prime q until $p = 2q + 1$

2. choose randomly $a \in \{2, \dots, p-1\}$ until

$a^2 \not\equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ and $a^q \not\equiv 1 \pmod{p}$

For $p = 2q + 1$ there are $\ell(\ell(p)) = \ell(p-1) = \underbrace{\ell(2)}_{2 \cdot q} \cdot \ell(q) = q - 1$
we have $q - 1$ PE

$$P(\text{Select a PE mod } p \text{ in step 2}) \approx \frac{q-1}{p-1} = \frac{q-1}{2q} \approx \frac{1}{2}$$

Remark: Primes p such that $2p+1$ is also prime are called Sophie-Germain primes (SG primes)

It is conjectured that

$$|\{p \mid p \text{ SG prime}, p \leq N\}| \sim \frac{2 \cdot c_2 \cdot N}{(\log N)^2}$$

with $c_2 \approx 0.66076$

Hence, there are sufficiently many SG primes.

See <http://primes.utm.edu/top20/page.php?id=2>

$$N = 2^{64} \Rightarrow \text{Prob of finding SG primes} \approx 0,68\% \approx \frac{1}{1491}$$


$\begin{matrix} \text{"} & \text{"} & 4 & \times & \text{"} & \text{"} \\ & & | & & | & \\ & & 4 & & 125\% & \approx \frac{1}{75} \end{matrix}$

G.) $|\{p \mid p \text{ prime}, p \leq N\}| \sim \frac{N}{\log(N)}$

• Intruder-in-the-middle attack on the DH system

Let $p = 2q + 1$, p prime, q prime, $a \not\equiv 1 \pmod{p}$

$a^q \equiv a^{(p-1)/2}$ has order 2, since $(a^{(p-1)/2})^2 \equiv a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$



Joint key for A and B: $K = a^{x+y+q} = (a^q)^{xy} \in \{-1, 1\}$

Oscar can try both keys.

Important: authenticity of the exponentials a^x, a^y
 ~ use digital signatures