## Review Exercise Advanced Methods of Cryptography

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Exercise 1. Consider the following cryptosystem with message space $\mathcal{M}$ and ciphertext space $\mathcal{C}$ as $\mathcal{M}=\mathcal{C}=\{0,1,2\}^{2}$. A message $\mathbf{m}=\left(m_{1}, m_{2}\right)$ is encrypted by means of an invertible matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{F}_{3}^{2 \times 2}$ as follows.

$$
e\left(m_{1}, m_{2}\right)=\left(c_{1}, c_{2}\right)^{T}=\mathbf{A}\left(m_{1}, m_{2}\right)^{T}
$$

This encryption scheme is used for a block cipher on messages of arbitrary length with the matrix

$$
\mathbf{A}=\left(\begin{array}{ll}
1 & 1 \\
1 & 2
\end{array}\right)
$$

(a) Encrypt the message $\mathbf{m}=(1,2,1,1)$ in the Cipher Blockchaining Mode (CBC) with initial value $C_{0}=(2,1)$.
(b) Specify the encryption and decryption rules for the Output Feedback Mode (OFB). Why is $Z_{0}=C_{0}=(0,0)$ an inappropriate initial value?

In the following, the cryptosystem shall be investigated for invertible matrices of the form

$$
\mathbf{A}=\left(\begin{array}{ll}
1 & x \\
y & z
\end{array}\right) \in \mathbb{F}_{3}^{2 \times 2}
$$

(c) Characterize the key space $\mathcal{K}$ and determine its cardinality.
(d) Specify the decryption rule $d\left(c_{1}, c_{2}\right)$.
(e) Has the system perfect secrecy, if the keys are uniformly distributed over $\mathcal{K}$, the messages are uniformly distributed over $\mathcal{M}$, and both are stochastically independent? Substantiate your answer.

Exercise 2. A public key cryptosystem for a plaintext $m=\sum_{i=1}^{n} m_{i} 2^{i-1}$ with $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $m_{i} \in\{0,1\}$ is given as follows:

## Key Generation:

(1) Choose a random sequence $\boldsymbol{w}=\left(w_{1}, w_{2}, \ldots, w_{n}\right)$, with $w_{i} \in \mathbb{N}$, such that $w_{k+1}>\sum_{i=1}^{k} w_{k}$ holds for $k=1, \ldots, n-1$.
(2) Choose $q \in \mathbb{N}$, such that $q>\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_{i}$ holds.
(3) Choose $r \in \mathbb{N}$ with $1 \leq r<q$, such that $\operatorname{gcd}(r, q)=1$ holds.
(4) Compute $\boldsymbol{\beta}=\left(\beta_{1}, \beta_{2}, \ldots, \beta_{n}\right)$ with $\beta_{i}=r w_{i} \bmod q$.
(5) The public key is $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ and the secret key is ( $\boldsymbol{w}, q, r$ ).

## Encryption Procedure:

The plaintext is encrypted as $c=\sum_{i=1}^{n} m_{i} \beta_{i}$.

## Decryption Procedure:

```
d}\leftarrowc\mp@subsup{r}{}{-1}\operatorname{mod}
for l=n downto 1 do
    if d\geq\mp@subsup{w}{l}{}}\mathrm{ then }\mp@subsup{m}{l}{}\leftarrow1\mathrm{ else }\mp@subsup{m}{l}{}\leftarrow0\mathrm{ end if
    d}\leftarrowd-\mp@subsup{m}{l}{}\mp@subsup{w}{l}{
end for
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(a) Show that $(\boldsymbol{w}, q, r)=\left(\left(2^{0}, 2^{1}, \ldots, 2^{n-1}\right), 2^{n}, 1\right)$ is a weak key in the sense that $m=c$.

Assume that $r \neq 1$ in the following.
(b) Show that $\beta_{1}, \ldots, \beta_{n}$ are pairwise different.

Alice encrypts two plaintexts $m \neq m^{\prime}$ of the same length $n$ with the same key $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ and obtains two different ciphertexts $c$ and $c^{\prime}$. A confidential source tells you that $m$ and $m^{\prime}$ only differ in one bit position $1 \leq j \leq n$, i.e., $m_{j} \neq m_{j}^{\prime}$ and $m_{i}=m_{i}^{\prime}$ for all $i \neq j$.
(c) How can the bit position $j$ be determined?

Bob encrypts a plaintext $m$ of length $n=5$. He chooses $w_{1}$ at random and uses the rules $w_{i}=2 w_{i-1}+1$ for $i=2, \ldots, n$ and $q=257$. His public key is $\boldsymbol{\beta}=(168,103,230,227,221)$.
(d) Your confidential source provides $w_{4}=63$. Determine the secret key $(\boldsymbol{w}, q, r)$ for the given $\boldsymbol{\beta}$. Hint: $257 \cdot 7-31 \cdot 58=1$.
(e) Now, you receive the ciphertext $c=846$. Compute $m$ for the given values.

Exercise 3. Alice uses the RSA cryptosystem with public key $(n, e)=(4891,1901)$ for signing.
(a) Compute the corresponding private key $d$.
(b) Generate the RSA signature $s=m^{d} \bmod n$ for the message $m=2013$.

In the following, a protocol for authentication of Alice (A) towards Bob (B) is given. It is based on an RSA system with public keys $\left(n, e_{A}\right),\left(n, e_{B}\right)$ and private keys $d_{A}, d_{B}$.

1) B chooses a random number $2 \leq r<n$, calculates $r_{A}=r^{e_{A}} \bmod n$ and sends $r_{A}$ to A .
2) A calculates $r=r_{A}{ }^{d_{A}} \bmod n$ and $r_{B}=r^{e_{B}} \bmod n$ and sends $r_{B}$ to B .
3) B checks, if $r=r_{B}{ }^{d_{B}} \bmod n$ holds. If this is true, A is authenticated towards B .

Alice uses two different public keys $\left(e \neq e_{A}\right)$ for signing and authentication. Oscar ( O ) does not know the private keys of Alice.
(c) How can Oscar impersonate Alice towards Bob?
(d) Why is Oscar not able to determine the random number $r$ ?

In the following, Alice utilizes the same public key $\left(e=e_{A}\right)$ for both signing and authentication.
(e) Is it possible for Oscar to now determine the random number $r$ ? If so, how?

Exercise 4. Consider the cubic equation $E: y^{2}=x^{3}+4 x+1$.
(a) Is $E$ an elliptic curve over $\mathbb{F}_{5}$ ? Substantiate your answer.
(b) Determine all points on the elliptic curve $E$ and the order of the corresponding group.
(c) Is point $Q=(1,1)$ a generator of the group? Substantiate your answer.

In analogy to the Square-and-Multiply algorithm in a ring $\mathbb{Z}_{n}$, the $k$-th multiple of $P$ can be algorithmically computed based on doubling and addition on an elliptic curve over a field $\mathbb{F}_{q}$. You may use the binary representation of factor $k=\left(k_{m}, \ldots, k_{0}\right)_{2}=\sum_{i=0}^{m} k_{i} 2^{i}$.
(d) Describe $45 P$ in terms of doubling and addition of $P$ only.
(e) Formulate an iterative Double-and-Add algorithm $f_{\mathrm{it}}(P, k)$ to calculate $k P$.
(f) Give a recursive version $f_{\text {rec }}(P, k)$ of the above Double-and-Add algorithm.

