

# Help-sheet for Cryptography

## Alphabet.

|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K  | L  | M  | N  | O  | P  | Q  | R  | S  | T  | U  | V  | W  | X  | Y  | Z  |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 |

## $\kappa$ -values.

German:  $\kappa_D = 0,0762$ , English:  $\kappa_E = 0,0669$ , French:  $\kappa_F = 0,0746$ .

## RSA.

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| Public key:  | $(n, e) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{Z}_{\varphi(n)}^*$ , |
|              | $n = pq$ , $p \neq q$ prime,                               |
| Private key: | $d = e^{-1} \pmod{\varphi(n)}$ ,                           |
| Message:     | $m \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}$ ,                                |
| Encryption:  | $c = m^e \pmod{n}$ ,                                       |
| Decryption:  | $m = c^d \pmod{n}$ .                                       |

## Goldwasser-Micali.

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| Public key:  | $n = pq$ for $p \neq q$ prime,<br>$y \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ pseudosquare modulo $n$ ,   |
| Private key: | $(p, q)$ ,   |
| Message:     | $m = (m_1, \dots, m_t) \in \{0, 1\}^t$ ,   |
| Encryption:  | choose independent random numbers<br>$x_1, \dots, x_t \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ ,  |
|              | $c_i = \begin{cases} yx_i^2 \pmod{n}, & \text{if } m_i = 1, \\ x_i^2 \pmod{n}, & \text{if } m_i = 0, \end{cases} i = 1, \dots, t.$ |
|              | $C = (c_1, \dots, c_t)$ ,  |

## Rabin.

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| Public key:  | $n = pq$ for primes $p \neq q$ ,<br>$p, q \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$ , |
| Private key: | $(p, q)$ ,   |
| Message:     | $m \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}$ ,                                    |
| Encryption:  | $c = m^2 \pmod{n}$ ,   |
| Decryption:  | find square roots<br>modulo $n$ .                              |

## Blum-Goldwasser.

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| Public key:  | $n = pq$ for primes $p \neq q$ ,<br>$p, q \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$ ,   |
| Private key: | $(p, q, a, b)$ with $ap + bq = 1$ ,  |
| Message:     | $m = (m_1, \dots, m_t) \in \{0, 1\}^{ht}$<br>with $h \leq \log_2 \lfloor \log_2 n \rfloor$ ,   |
| Encryption:  | choose random QR $x_0$ modulo $n$ ,<br>$x_i = x_{i-1}^2 \pmod{n}$ , $i = 1, \dots, t+1$ ,<br>$b_i$ : last $h$ bits of $x_i$ ,<br>$c_i = m_i \oplus b_i$ , $i = 1, \dots, t$ ,<br>$C = (c_1, \dots, c_t, x_{t+1})$ ,  |
| Decryption:  | $d_1 = (\frac{p+1}{4})^{t+1} \pmod{(p-1)}$ ,<br>$d_2 = (\frac{q+1}{4})^{t+1} \pmod{(q-1)}$ ,<br>$u = x_{t+1}^{d_1} \pmod{p}$ , $v = x_{t+1}^{d_2} \pmod{q}$ ,<br>$x_0 = vap + ubq \pmod{n}$ ,<br>$x_i = x_{i-1}^2 \pmod{n}$ , $i = 1, \dots, t+1$ ,<br>$b_i$ : last $h$ bits of $x_i$ ,<br>$m_i = c_i \oplus b_i$ , $i = 1, \dots, t$ ,<br>$m = (m_1, \dots, m_t)$ . |

## ElGamal.

|                    |  |
|--------------------|--|
| System parameters: | prime $p$ ,<br>Generator $a$ modulo $p$ ,  |
| Private key:       | $x \in \{2, \dots, p-2\}$ ,  |
| Public key:        | $y = a^x \pmod{p}$ ,   |
| Message:           | $m \in \{1, \dots, p-1\}$ ,  |
| Encryption:        | choose random $k \in \{2, \dots, p-2\}$ ,<br>$K = y^k \pmod{p}$ ,<br>$c_1 = a^k \pmod{p}$ ,<br>$c_2 = Km \pmod{p}$ ,<br>$c = (c_1, c_2)$ , |
| Decryption:        | $K = c_1^x \pmod{p}$ ,<br>$K^{-1} = c_1^{p-1-x} \pmod{p}$ ,<br>$m = K^{-1}c_2 \pmod{p}$ .  |

### ElGamal-Signatures.

|                    |   |
|--------------------|---|
| System parameters: | prime $p$ ,   |
|                    | Generator $a$ modulo $p$ ,  |
| Private key:       | $x \in \{2, \dots, p-2\}$ ,   |
| Public key:        | $y = a^x \pmod{p}$ ,  |
| Hash function:     | $h : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{1, \dots, p-1\}$ ,   |
| Document:          | $m \in \{0,1\}^*$ ,   |
| Signature:         | choose random $k \in \{2, \dots, p-2\}$ ,<br>$\gcd(k, p-1) = 1$ ,<br>calculate $r = a^k \pmod{p}$ ,<br>$k^{-1} \pmod{(p-1)}$ , $h(m)$ ,<br>$s = k^{-1}(h(m) - xr) \pmod{(p-1)}$<br>the signature of $m$ is $(r, s)$ , |
| Verification:      | check $1 \leq r \leq p-1$ ,<br>$v_1 = y^r r^s \pmod{p}$ ,<br>$v_2 = a^{h(m)} \pmod{p}$ ,<br>accept, if $v_1 = v_2$ .  |

### Addition rules for elliptic curves.

Let  $P_1 = (x_1, y_1)$  and  $P_2 = (x_2, y_2) \in E(L)$  for  $L \supseteq K$ .

(i) If  $P_1 \neq \pm P_2$ , than  $P_1 + P_2 = (x_3, y_3)$  with

$$\begin{aligned} x_3 &= \left( \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} \right)^2 - x_1 - x_2, \\ y_3 &= \left( \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} \right) (x_1 - x_3) - y_1, \end{aligned}$$

(ii) if  $P_1 \neq -P_1$ , than  $2P_1 = P_1 + P_1 = (x_3, y_3)$  with

$$\begin{aligned} x_3 &= \left( \frac{3x_1^2 + a}{2y_1} \right)^2 - 2x_1, \\ y_3 &= \left( \frac{3x_1^2 + a}{2y_1} \right) (x_1 - x_3) - y_1. \end{aligned}$$

### DSA.

|                    |  |
|--------------------|--|
| System parameters: | primes $p, q$ with $q \mid p-1$ ,<br>$a \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ element of order $q$ ,   |
| Private key:       | $x \in \{2, \dots, q-1\}$ ,  |
| Public key:        | $y = a^x \pmod{p}$ ,   |
| Hashfunction:      | $h : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{1, \dots, q\}$ ,  |
| Document:          | $m \in \{0,1\}^*$ ,  |
| Signature:         | choose random $k \in \{2, \dots, q-1\}$ ,<br>calculate $r = (a^k \pmod{p}) \pmod{q}$ ,<br>$k^{-1} \pmod{q}$ , $h(m)$<br>$s = k^{-1}(h(m) + xr) \pmod{q}$<br>the signature of $m$ is $(r, s)$ ,               |
| Verification:      | check $0 < r < q$ and $0 < s < q$ ,<br>calculate $w = s^{-1} \pmod{q}$ and $h(m)$ ,<br>$u_1 = wh(m) \pmod{q}$ , $u_2 = rw \pmod{q}$ ,<br>$v = (a^{u_1} y^{u_2} \pmod{p}) \pmod{q}$ ,<br>accept, if $v = r$ . |

### Feige-Fiat-Shamir-Identification.

|                    |  |
|--------------------|--|
| System parameters: | primes $p \neq q$ , $p, q \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$ ,<br>TA publishes $n = pq$ ,                |
|                    | each user chooses $s_1, \dots, s_k \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}$ ,<br>$\gcd(s_i, n) = 1$ ,      |
|                    | and publishes $v_i = (s_i^2)^{-1} \pmod{n}$ , $i = 1, \dots, k$ ,                        |
| Protocol:          | $A$ chooses random $r$ ,<br>calculates $x = r^2 \pmod{n}$ ,<br>$A \rightarrow B$ : $x$ , |
|                    | $B$ chooses random bits $b_1, \dots, b_k \in \{0, 1\}$ ,                                 |
|                    | $A \leftarrow B$ : $(b_1, \dots, b_k)$ ,   |
|                    | $A$ calculates $y = r \prod_{j=1}^k s_j^{b_j} \pmod{n}$ ,                                |
|                    | $A \rightarrow B$ : $y$ ,  |
|                    | $B$ calculates $z = y^2 \prod_{j=1}^k v_j^{b_j} \pmod{n}$ ,<br>accepts, if $z = x$ .     |